Senate Bill 12-038 May Have Unintended Consequences for Colorado Homeowners and Public Adjusters

February 22, 2012 |

Among the new proposed legislation making its way through the Colorado legislature this year is Colorado Senate Bill No. 38, “Concerning Measures To Protect Consumers Who Engage A Roofing Contractor To Perform Roofing Services On Residential Property.” The bill is sponsored by Democratic Senator Lois Tochtrop and Republican House Representative Glenn Vaad.

In its present form, the bill requires residential roofing contractors to sign a written contract with customers which include the following details:

  • The costs of the services;
  • The roofing contractor's contact information;
  • Identification of the roofing contractor's surety and liability coverage insurer and their contact information, if applicable;
  • The roofing contractor's policy regarding cancellation of the contract and refund of any deposit, including a rescission clause allowing the client to rescind the contract and obtain a full refund of any deposit within 72 hours after entering the contract; and
  • A written statement that if the client plans to use the proceeds of a property or casualty insurance policy to pay for the roofing work, the roofing contractor cannot pay, waive, rebate, or promise to pay, waive, or rebate all or part of any deductible applicable to the claim for payment for roofing work on the covered residential property.

See Bill No. 38, Bill Summary.

The Bill attempts to provide consumers additional protections against unscrupulous roofing companies. Certain requirements in the bill are tied to the homeowner’s property insurer—and that insurer’s decision regarding coverage or denial of the homeowner’s roof damage claim. Specifically,

A person who enters into a contract with a roofing contractor to perform roofing work on his or her residential property and who submits a claim to his or her property and casualty insurer for payment for the roofing work may rescind the contract for the roofing work if the insurer denies the claim in whole or in part, as long as the person notifies the roofing contractor within 72 hours after the claim is denied. The roofing contractor must refund any moneys paid by the customer within 10 days after receipt of the cancellation notice.

The Bill also prohibits roofing companies from making any offer or promise to cover or reimburse the homeowner’s insurance deductible.

When residential roofing work will be paid from the proceeds of a property and casualty insurance policy covering the residential property, the roofing contractor is prohibited from paying, waiving, rebating, or offering or promising to pay, waive, or rebate all or part of any deductible that applies to the claim.

The written contract requirements and the right to rescind portions of the Bill appear to achieve the objective of consumer protection (albeit logistical nightmares for even the most honest and professional roofing companies). However, the Bill is problematic, and in fact harmful to consumers when it comes to the consequences for roofing companies that violate the prohibition on offers or promises to pay/waive/rebate the homeowner’s deductible. The Bill states,

6-22-105. Waiver of insurance deductible prohibited.
(1) A ROOFING CONTRACTOR THAT PERFORMS ROOFING WORK, THE PAYMENT FOR WHICH WILL BE MADE FROM THE PROCEEDS OF A PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE POLICY ISSUED PURSUANT TO PART 1 OF ARTICLE 4 OF TITLE 10, C.R.S., SHALL NOT ADVERTISE OR PROMISE TO PAY, WAIVE, OR REBATE ALL OR PART OF ANY INSURANCE DEDUCTIBLE APPLICABLE TO THE CLAIM FOR PAYMENT FOR ROOFING WORK ON THE COVERED RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY.
(2) IF A ROOFING CONTRACTOR VIOLATES SUBSECTION (1) OF THIS SECTION:
(a) THE INSURER TO WHOM THE PROPERTY OWNER SUBMITTED THE CLAIM FOR PAYMENT FOR THE ROOFING WORK IS NOT OBLIGATED TO CONSIDER THE ESTIMATE OF COSTS FOR THE ROOFING WORK PREPARED BY THE ROOFING CONTRACTOR; AND
(b) THE PROPERTY OWNER WHOSE RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY IS INSURED UNDER THE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE POLICY OR THE INSURER THAT ISSUED THE POLICY MAY BRING AN ACTION AGAINST THE ROOFING CONTRACTOR IN A COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION TO RECOVER DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY THE PROPERTY OWNER OR INSURER AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE VIOLATION.

Subsection (2) (a) above is harmful to consumers for several reasons: (1) it directly affects the protections afforded to consumers under C.R.S. 10-3-1115 and -1116, and bad faith common law, by releasing insurers from their duty to perform a timely and thorough investigation of the loss, which often includes a reasonable review and consideration of all damage estimates put forth by the insured homeowner; and (2) it forces the insured homeowner to suffer the consequences of the unscrupulous roofer’s actions.

Moreover, subsection (2) (b) above places a huge burden on the homeowner to prosecute not only their roof damages claim against their insurer, but in addition take on an second action in court to pursue damages against a roofing company that caused the non-payment of their roof damage claim.

Imagine the following likely scenario:

Grandma suffers terrible hail damage to her roof. Grandma submits a claim to her insurer for the roof damage. Insurer responds that the roof may or may not be covered (the adjuster saw some wear and tear on the roof) and Grandma must submit an estimate of hail damage to the insurer so that insurer can investigate and adjust the claim.

Roofer comes to Grandma’s door the next day soliciting the roof repair work. Grandma’s roof is leaking and more hail and rain is predicted in the coming week. Grandma signs a contract with the roofer, in part because she desperately needs a new roof, and in part because the roofer offers to rebate her insurance deductible via discounts in the roofer’s bill.

Grandma submits the roofer’s scope of work and invoice to her insurer requesting immediate coverage for the damage and an ACV payment so Grandma can get the roofer started working immediately. The insurer learns from Grandma that the roofer offered to reimburse Grandma for her insurance deductible, thus the insurer (based on the above Bill) refuses to even consider the roofer’s estimate.

Now, even though Grandma can rescind her contract with the roofer, Grandma’s roof leak is worse, rain and hail continue to leak causing additional damage to her interior, and she now has no insurance coverage (and not even the prospect of receiving a benefits check anytime soon), and no roofer signed up to start the work. Worst of all, she now has to take on the burden and cost of hiring a public adjuster or a lawyer to pursue a claim against her insurance company, as well as file a separate action against the roofer for his violation of the above Bill provisions. Grandma has neither the money nor the resources to find the proper lawyer to pursue these two separate actions.

As the Bill is worded now, it places far too heavy a burden on the homeowner. The homeowner is left in a position where she may have to fight both her insurer and the roofer, and still have an unrepaired roof. It would make more sense to place the burden of going after the unscrupulous roofer entirely on the insurer (i.e., the one party in this equation with sufficient money and resources).

Next week’s post will further discuss the Bill and additional possible unintended consequences as to homeowners, public adjusters, and professional roofers whose proper scope of work may not match up with the insurer’s goals of saving money by reducing the overall scope of work and reducing the insurer’s payout on roof claims.

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New York Department of Financial Services Launches Industry-wide Audit of Health Insurance Rates

February 22, 2012 |

by Michael Rosenfield & Dennis Quinn

The New York Department of Financial Services (“DFS”) will audit the accuracy of the data used by insurers and health maintenance organizations to request health insurance rate increases (see press release). 

In connection therewith, health insurers must submit their rate increase proposals to the DFS for “prior approval.” The DFS can approve, reduce or reject the requests.

The audits will, among other things, allow the regulators to:

  1. ascertain if insurers are accurately allocating administrative costs and producer commissions;
  2. ensure that insurers have proper controls and oversight in place to make certain that data is reliable and accurate; and
  3. assist in identifying areas where action can be taken to help control costs.

The DFS will conduct on-site audits of health insurers and HMOs selling health insurance plans regulated by the state – employer, small group and individual policies.

The DFS has announced that:

[t]he audits will review selected rate requests that have already been filed. Insurers will not know beforehand whether their proposals will be the subject of an audit. Data regarding claims, insurer administrative expenses, premiums and claims reserves will be examined. The Department will hire a private accounting firm to assist DFS personnel in conducting the audits.”

For further information, please contact Michael Rosenfield at 213-614-7321 | mrosenfield@bargerwolen.com, or Dennis Quinn at 212-655-3878 | dquinn@bargerwolen.com.

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California’s Reader Privacy Act: What Every Bookseller Must Know

February 21, 2012 |

by Dawn Valentine and Timothy Moroney

On January 1, 2012, the California Reader Privacy Act went into effect. The Act requires all “book service providers,” i.e., book sellers, in the State to take certain steps when responding to governmental requests for user information and to make specific reports and disclosures regarding those requests.

The Act protects unauthorized disclosure of private information regarding books and book readers.

California consumers are increasingly utilizing digital book services and providers and in connection therewith such entities may collect detailed personal information about consumers such as books browsed, how much time is spent reading each page, and digital notes made in the margins. The Act is meant to address implicated privacy issues and codify the privacy and free speech safeguards for expressive records guaranteed by the California Constitution. 

The Act prohibits book service providers—defined as any service that has as its primary purpose the “rental, purchase, borrowing, browsing, or viewing of books”—from knowingly disclosing the personal information of any of its users to a law enforcement agency except per a valid court order based on probable cause and a determination that the requesting agency has a compelling interest in obtaining the information that could not be obtained by less obtrusive means. 

Prior to issuing an order to disclose user information, the book service provider must have been provided “reasonable notice” to allow it the opportunity to appear and contest the issuance of the order. 

Once a book service provider receives a court order seeking disclosure of a user’s personal information, the service provider must notify the user so that he or she has a chance to appear or quash the order. 

The Act also imposes certain reporting requirements on all book service providers. If a book service provider discloses the personal information of 30 or more California users in a year it is required to prepare a report that is to be made publicly available in an online searchable format. A book service provider with a commercial web site is required to either create a prominent hyper link to the report required under this Act or state that no report was prepared because the service provider was exempt from the reporting requirement. (because less than 30 disclosures were made). 

The provisions of the Act are ignored at a book service provider’s peril. A service provider that violates the Act is subject to civil penalties to the user and/or Attorney General and the Act may be the basis of civil actions and liability brought by either the user or an attorney general or district attorney within two years of discovery of any violation of the Act. 

For more information or any questions regarding the requirements of the newly enacted Reader Privacy Act, please contact Dawn Valentine, 415-743-3731 dvalentine@bargerwolen.com or Tim Moroney, 415-743-3713, tmoroney@bargerwolen.com. 

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Texas Wesleyan School of Law Presents Wildfire Law: Private Property & Public Interests

February 21, 2012 |

I’d like to take this opportunity to tell you about a great symposium being put on by students at Texas Weslayan School of Law in Fort Worth, Texas.

Here are the details:

Wildfire Law: Private Property & Public Interests
Date: Friday, March 23, 2012
Time: 8:30 A.M. - 3:00 P.M., reception to follow
Email: TWjournalsymposium@gmail.com
Cost: $50.00, includes breakfast, lunch, and afternoon reception
CLE: 4 hours (approval pending)

The symposium will focus on federal and state law, as well as policy issues regarding wildfires. The symposium will showcase seven presenters spanning the law and policy of seven states, including Texas.

If you are in the industry, it might behoove you to attend given this past summer’s wildfires in Central Texas.

For more information, click here or email TWjournalsymposium@gmail.com. You can register for the symposium here.

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It Could Be Bad Faith Too, if…..

February 21, 2012 |

Generally speaking, when talking about bad faith claims in California, it involves unreasonable delay or withholding benefits to the insured. In most instances when an insurance carrier fully and promptly pays the benefits due to an insured, a bad faith claim is not viable. Even if the insurance adjuster’s conduct is hostile or over the top, in the absence of an unreasonable delay or withholding of benefit, case law indicates that no breach of contract or breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists. See Delgado v. Heritage Life Ins. Co.(1984) 157 Cal. App. 3d 262.

However, in California, there are three distinct exceptions that have been adjudicated and are considered bad faith despite an insurer’s timely payment of a first party claim:

1) Insurer’s Concealment: In the matter of McMillin Scripps North Partnership v. Royal Ins. Co. of America (1993) 19 Cal. App. 4th 1215, the Court ruled that despite a prompt payment of the policy limits of $10,000 on an insured’s fire loss, the insurance company acted in bad faith because it concealed to the insured that the fire had been caused by a third party who had $100,000 liability coverage with the same carrier. The Court found that the concealment breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

2) Insurer Bars Insured’s Counterclaim: In Barney v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (1986) 185 Cal. App. 3d 966, the Court ruled that the insurance company breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it entered into a settlement that effectively barred the insured from filing a counterclaim. The insurance company has a duty to its insured not to "knowingly use its discretionary power under the policy to effect a settlement in a manner injurious of plaintiff’s rights." Id. 977-978.

3) Favoring One Insured Over Another: Courts have decided that when all benefits are paid in full, insurance companies must ensure they do not favor one insured to the detriment of another. Such favoritism can breach the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In Schwartz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. (2001) 88 Cal. App. 4th 1329, the Court found that when an insurer paid out a policy limit on an uninsured motorist claim by passengers in the insured vehicle, the insurer prejudiced the insured’s potential recovery.

Overall, California courts don’t like to find bad faith when policy limits are paid. However, courts consider whether an insurer has breached a duty that may harm its own insured on a case by case basis.

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Remember the Basics–Make Sure the Insured Knows Whether Subrogation Counsel is Representing Their Interests

February 20, 2012 |

 

It is not uncommon for subrogation counsel to file suit in the name of the insured for a variety of reasons. The most obvious is when counsel represents the insured for their uninsured losses or their deductible. However, there are times that for tactical reasons, counsel files suit in the name of the insured to try and avoid the bias that often accompanies an action filed in the name of the carrier. Although the deductible may be accounted for in a suit filed in the name of the insured, if the insured suffered any uninsured losses, they may not be included unless counsel has entered into a retention agreement with the insured. Unless a proper agreement is in place, the carrier and subrogation counsel run the risk of being sued by a disgruntled insured whose uninsured losses were not included in the carrier’s suit. There is a simple solution to avoid such a problem – make it clear to the insured whether or not their claims are included in the lawsuit, especially when suit is filed in the name of the insured. 

 

A perfect example of what can happen when the insured is not advised whether their uninsured losses are included in the carrier’s action occurred in Sandman v. Quincy Mut. Fire Ins. Co., et al. (Mass. App. No. 10 – P-2080 January 25, 2012). The case stemmed from Quincy Mutual’s subrogation action against a heating oil delivery company that spilled 100 gallons of fuel oil in Elaine Sandman’s property during a delivery. Quincy Mutual covered the remediation costs to clean up the oil spill, which was over $200,000, but denied coverage for damage to Sandman’s personal property due to a policy exclusion. Quincy Mutual then retained subrogation counsel to recover its remediation costs from the oil delivery company. 

 

Approximately two weeks after the spill, as Sandman was looking for an attorney to represent her uninsured losses, Quincy Mutual’s subrogation counsel contacted her and introduced himself as the attorney hired by Quincy Mutual to pursue her claims against the oil delivery company. For the next five years, counsel consistently led Sandman to believe he represented her interests as well as those of Quincy Mutual. Most of those representations were oral, but in one letter counsel sent to Sandman, he referred to her as a client and stated that, “[o]nce we receive the final figure suit will be entered in the Superior Court against parties responsible for damages to your property.” Counsel never informed Sandman that he had not filed suit on her behalf and was only seeking to recover the damages Quincy Mutual paid out on her claim. Sandman assisted counsel in answering interrogatories, and he represented her at her deposition. When the case settled in the spring of 2009, counsel informed Sandman, for the first time, that he was only representing Quincy Mutual. Counsel then told Sandman he could not assist her in pursuing her claims against the oil delivery company because he had a conflict of interest as Quincy Mutual’s attorney. By that time, Sandman’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations. 

 

Sandman sued both Quincy Mutual and its subrogation counsel for misrepresentation, malpractice, negligent affliction of emotional distress, violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violations of G.L.c. 93A (the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act). Sandman claimed Quincy Mutual’s subrogation counsel told her that Quincy Mutual had hired him to pursue her uninsured losses as well as the subrogated claim, but failed to do so. Sandman’s claim against Quincy Mutual was that it was vicariously liable for the malpractice and misrepresentations of its subrogation counsel. Quincy Mutual argued that it could not be vicariously liable for the representations and professional negligence of its subrogation counsel because as an attorney and an independent professional, counsel had a non-delegable duty of care to Sandman. 

 

Fortunately, the court agreed and relied on the holding in Herbert A. Sullivan, Inc. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 439 Mass. 387 (2003), wherein the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that since an insurer is not permitted to practice law, it must rely on independent counsel for the conduct of the litigation, and in doing so, does not assume a non-delegable duty to present an adequate defense or representation of the insured. Id. at 408-409. The Court went on to hold that since the conduct of the litigation is the responsibility of trial counsel, the insurer is not vicariously liable for the negligence of the attorneys who conduct the defense or representation of the insured.  Id. 

In dismissing Sandman’s Complaint against Quincy Mutual, the court held there was no basis upon which Quincy Mutual may be vicariously liable for its subrogation counsel’s malpractice because it was counsel who controlled the strategy, conduct, and daily details of representation of the insured, and counsel’s ethical obligations to the insured prevented the insurer from exercising the degree of control necessary to justify the imposition of vicarious liability. Although Sandman’s action against Quincy Mutual was dismissed, her malpractice suit against Quincy Mutual’s subrogation counsel is still pending. 

 

Although the insured’s action against Quincy Mutual was dismissed, the entire suit could have been avoided if subrogation counsel had clearly spelled out whether or not the insured’s uninsured claims were being pursued in the carrier’s action against the defendant tortfeasor. If counsel had entered into a retention agreement with the insured to represent her uninsured losses, the details of the representation would have been spelled out as required by the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct. Subrogation counsel’s failure to enter into a retention agreement with the insured, and failure to advise the insured that her losses were not being pursued, caused his client, the property insurance carrier, to be dragged into a lawsuit unnecessarily. It also landed him in a malpractice suit. In order to avoid a similar situation from occurring in the future, counsel has to make the insured aware of their role in the case and whether or not the insured’s uninsured losses are being represented in any lawsuit.

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How Much Deference Is Given To Jury Verdicts On Appeal?

February 20, 2012 |

On February 13, 2012, Jeremy Tyler wrote South Florida Juries Reach Different Conclusions In Late Notice Hurricane Cases, which discussed two recent hurricane cases that went to trial in South Florida courts. Following a verdict and judgment entered in a case, parties can seek review of the judgment by appeal. After a case proceeds through trial, the appellate court’s standard of review, or deference to the findings of fact and legal decisions at trial, can determine the outcome of an appeal.

The following are appellate standards of review:

  • De Novo. The court gives no deference to the lower court’s legal decisions and considers the legal decisions independently;
  • Clearly Erroneous. Review under the clearly erroneous standard is significantly deferential. The appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless it is left with the “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 (1982);
  • Substantial Evidence. Review under this standard means a decision will be upheld as long as there is competent and substantial evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a verdict. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971);
  • Abuse of Discretion. Under this standard, the appellate court will affirm unless it determines that the trial court has made a clear error of judgment or has applied an incorrect legal standard.

Generally speaking, appellate courts draw an important distinction between the review of factual issues and the review of legal issues. Conclusions of law receive de novo review, while findings of fact are typically reviewed under the more deferential standards. In Hudson Pulp & Paper Corporation v. Butler & Company, a Florida appellate court explained how it reviews a jury verdict.

In our review of the record we have given due consideration to the applicable appellate principle that a judgment of the trial court reaches the appellate court clothed with a presumption of correctness. Our review of the record reveals that although the testimony is conflicting, there is substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict and judgment thereon. It is not the province of this court to substitute its judgment for that of the trier of the facts. These findings will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear showing that the trial court committed error or that the evidence demonstrates that the conclusions reached are erroneous.

In Workmen's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bella Vista Hotel Apartments, Inc., 399 F.2d 693 (11th Cir. 1968), a claim for damages caused by Hurricane Betsy went to trial before a jury, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the policyholder. The insurer appealed, arguing that the loss was excluded by the policy terms. The jury was instructed to consider the policy exclusions the insurer cited the denial. The appellate court held:

It was not unreasonable for the jury to find that the damages suffered were caused by wind and not by the excluded causes. There was evidence from which the jury could make this finding.

A party has a difficult standard to meet on appeal if the sole basis for appellate review is that the jury verdict and final judgment entered were in error, as jury verdicts are usually given great deference. A different standard of review should apply if a party argues on appeal that the jury instructions were inappropriate or that there were other legal errors before, during or after a trial. Issues of law are more open for review and interpretation.

Because today is Presidents' Day, it seems fitting to end with a quote from Thomas Jefferson regarding the importance of trial by jury:

I consider trial by jury as the only anchor yet imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its constitution.

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Measuring a Business Income Loss Is Not Weird Science – Understanding Business Interruption Claims

February 19, 2012 |

“If the facts don’t fit the theory, change the facts” – Albert Einstein

Unlike physicists and philosophers, lawyers, adjusters and accountants don’t have the luxury of changing hard facts when measuring, evaluating and adjusting business income claims. Einstein’s universal approach, however, does not mean that facts (or data in this context) should be destroyed or created to fit a particular accounting theory, it rather means that the source of data should be curiously evaluated to come up with simple solutions to the most complex problems.

Business interruption claims can get complicated rather quickly when parties cannot agree on a methodology to measure the amount of the lost profits during the period of interruption. To resolve the stalemate, both parties will probably have to retain coverage counsel, adjusters and accountants to facilitate the claims process and streamline the coverage and measurement issues.

These teams of business income loss professionals, however, must first have a clear understanding of how the policyholder captures its financial data, to then be able to fit the data within the language of the insurance contract in question.

Bruce Smith, CPA, CFF, CFE recently stated in Accounting for Business Income Loss that:

To properly measure a business income loss it is essential to understand how economic transactions are recorded on the policyholder’s financial statements (GAAP vs. other method), and the difference and similarities between accounting and insurance terminology.

An income statement (financial statement) may be recorded on a cash basis, accrual basis, or other basis of accounting. If transactions are recorded on a cash basis, then revenue is not recorded until it is collected and expenses are not recorded until paid. If they are recorded on an accrual basis (GAAP), then revenue is recorded when earned; expenses are recorded when incurred.

The accrual basis of accounting will provide a more accurate reflection of the actual business activity during a certain period of time, as it matches revenue earned to its related costs and expenses incurred. As the business income loss calculation measures the difference between expected profit and actual profit earned during the period of interruption, an income statement prepared on an accrual basis of accounting would be the preferred method of accounting for those analyzing a business income loss. However, as previously noted, many policyholders’ income statements are not prepared on an accrual basis. Therefore, a conversion of the non-accrual income statement to an accrual basis is needed to properly calculate a business income loss. 

After the data is gathered and organized, and absent clear definitions in the policy language, the team of business income professionals must choose the appropriate loss-measurement methodology. At this juncture, the deadlock between the parties will hinge on whether the insured’s ability to generate revenue and profit can be truly predicted with the data that existed before the loss occurred or whether post-loss market conduct should be considered as part of the equation.

Not all businesses are alike and not all keep their operational data in the same manner. It is therefore impossible to measure all business income losses “with the same ruler” and the facts must sometimes “change” to fit the theory of recovery.

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Citizens’ Policyholders Should Speak Out and Take a Listen

February 18, 2012 |

Folk singer Kevin Roth, thinks now is the time for Floridians to do something about the state run property insurance corporation and has put his thoughts to music. Roth was inspired to write his song about Citizens after he received a notice from Citizens indicating his coverage would now exclude his screened-porch and carport. Roth contacted his agent and learned that his premiums would also rise. The prospect of paying much more for less inspired Roth to write this song. He hopes it will raise awareness of the issue and that individuals will join together and take initiative to fix what Roth calls a "broken system." He recognizes that the problems with Citizens did not start because of Governor Rick Scott's action but he thinks policyholders need to voice their concerns to Governor Scott and not be apathetic to the situation.

Kevin Roth has been an artist since 1972, but this is the first time he felt compelled to write a protest song. Roth believes the public has a responsibility to say something now before the 2012 hurricane season. Roth is encouraged that individuals can make a difference and cited to the recent example with the Susan G. Komen for the Cure funding change that was reversed after the recent public outcry.

Roth's video message is available here and will be available for download on February 21st.

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This Week on DIAttorney.com (02/18/2012)

February 18, 2012 |

Disability Blog & Cases:
Weston Engineering employee sues AETNA Life Insurance Company for denied disability benefits

Richard R. and his Illinois disability attorney filed a lawsuit in the United District Court in the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division on December 9, 2010 against his employer and AETNA Life Insurance Company for long term disability benefits. A Weston Engineering Inc. employee since July 6, 2009, Richard R., a headache sufferer since he was a teenager, complained to his family doctor of intensification of his headache problems. Consequently, Richard R.’s doctor increased Richard R.’s pain medication to try to remedy the situation.

FAQ: Disability Policy Language
What should I be aware of if I am buying a disability insurance policy?

It is important to take into consideration that every disability income policy may have different features.

FAQ: Disability Companies
What are the differences between an individual disability insurance policy and an ERISA / Group disability policy?

Most group disability policies (also known as ERISA policies) are governed by a very complex federal statute called the Employees Retirement Income Securities Act (“ERISA”). An individual usually has a disability policy governed by ERISA, if they received the disability policy as an employee benefit from an employer.

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